The raw reasoning block remains inside the protected endpoint.
It does not enter ordinary application state, logs, or cross-session payloads.
A response to new reasoning replay research
The paper shows that a valid opaque reasoning artifact can be replayed in another context without breaking its encryption. Mirror makes that state non-portable by binding it to its original user, session, and model.
Source paper Stealing Reasoning Traces from Proprietary LLM APIs 315,320 public reasoning blocks decodedThe paper shows that opaque reasoning can become portable. Mirror replaces the raw artifact with a context-bound handle, then this live test tries to move it.
mre_v1_...
Run the live GPT-5.4 request
Mirror keeps raw provider state inside its authorized context.
It does not enter ordinary application state, logs, or cross-session payloads.
The handle is safe to retain because it carries no reusable raw reasoning state.
A changed binding invalidates the handle before another provider request is made.
The missing threat window
Zero Data Retention is valuable: it limits logs, storage, and secondary use after processing. It is not a complete security boundary because conventional inference still receives usable plaintext.
The flow map shows the uncovered runtime, state, safety, and tool boundaries. The matrix verifies each claim against the same primary-source dataset.
Start with the flow to see where data branches into inference, safety, state, and tools. Switch to the matrix for an eight-boundary audit. Both views use the same sourced facts.
Flow explains. Matrix verifies.
Follow one input through product eligibility, agent inference, and every retention branch. Width is not traffic volume.
Follow one request into every place the privacy promise can change.
Safety review, caches, stateful APIs, grounding, files, vector stores, and external tools can each create a separate retention boundary.
AWS can deny incompatible models through IAM. Azure exposes its content-logging state. OpenAI and Anthropic expose organization-level eligibility and configuration.
They govern training, storage, access, and deletion around conventional inference. They do not state that the remote model evaluated ciphertext.
Mirror does not replace provider ZDR. It adds cryptographic boundaries before selected workloads reach remote infrastructure, then keeps residual-data controls as defense in depth.
Local encryption, ciphertext compute on supported models, encrypted egress, and local answer release.
Local protected observe and recall requests, with an encrypted-response option for client-side release.
Client-side vector envelope encryption keeps vector contents out of SDK telemetry and ordinary payload capture.
Sealed datasets, encrypted case results, version bindings, and verifiable evaluation receipts.
Scoped authorization, entitlement, metering, and protected state movement between independently operated agents.
{ "input": "private strategy…" }
Plaintext is processed
TLS protects the network hop.
The conventional service receives usable plaintext.
Policy and configuration govern storage afterward.
{ "ciphertext": "a93f…7c11" }
Only ciphertext is processed
The customer endpoint encrypts before sending.
The remote service computes without the secret key.
The encrypted result is released locally.
The ZDR lane above is an architectural comparison grounded in provider documentation. The encrypted lane below makes a real mirror/glm-5.3-flash request and checks the protected envelope before remote inference.
The live run will report the ciphertext envelope, remote compute mode, encrypted response, and local release.
No claim inferred before a successful run.
Use ZDR as defense in depth for logs and residual data. Use FHE when the remote inference operator must not receive prompt plaintext.
Read the sourced analysis →A real GPT-5.4 request creates protected reasoning state. The test moves its handle to a different context and verifies that Mirror blocks it before another model runs.
A real request uses a safe Mirror handle bound to the user, session, and exact model.
Run this path to collect evidence from a real model request.
The block was valid, but the system did not verify whether it belonged to this user, session, model, and turn.
Mirror keeps the raw reasoning envelope out of application state, then verifies the actor, session, exact model, and permitted continuation before reuse.
mre_v1_... handleSafe to retain, useless elsewhereCustomers are owed the agreed output: answers, citations, tool receipts, evaluation evidence, and any contracted reasoning summary. Providers can keep weights and raw hidden traces private.
Fairness is not both sides revealing everything. It is both sides controlling what they reveal.
The live proof tests Mirror's protections. The attack findings below remain sourced paper evidence, not a public attack tool.
Reasoning blocks in shared logs can contain sensitive values that never appeared in the final answer.
Recovered traces can bypass anti-distillation controls and expose proprietary reasoning behavior.
Hidden reasoning can retain unsafe information that the visible response correctly withheld.
An opaque block can carry instructions that application reviewers and logging systems cannot inspect.
The application receives the agreed result and a safe continuation handle, not a portable private reasoning artifact.